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8TATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF IS8UES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellant's statement of issues notwithstanding, there is 
only one issue before the court: Did the trial court err by 
finding that Murray City's denial of the conditional use permit 
was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal? The standard of review 
is statutorily limited to evaluation of the record and 
determination of whether Murray City's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence. Patterson v. Utah County Bd of Adjustment, 
893 P.2d 602, 603-04 (Utah App. 1995). Murray City's decision is 
entitled to a statutory presumption of validity. Utah Code Ann. 
S 10-9-1001(3)(a). To overcome this presumption, Appellants are 
required to marshal the evidence in the record in support of the 
City's decision before challenging whether it is substantial. 
Patterson at 605. See also VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n., 270 UAR 
13, 14 (Utah App. 1995) (marshaling is required prior to applying 
substantial evidence test)• 
Whether Murray City improperly denied Oak the right to 
proceed with construction on its 24-unit project after lapse of a 
period prescribed by ordinance is a question of law subject to a 
correctness standard of review. Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 
836 P.2d 797, 800 (Utah App. 1992). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
10-9-1001. Appeals. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court 
a municipality's land use decisions made 
under this chapter or under the regulation 
made under authority of this chapter until 
they have exhausted their administrative 
remedies. 
(2) Any person adversely affected by any 
decision made in the exercise of the 
provisions of this chapter may file a 
petition for review of the decision with the 
district court within 30 days after the local 
decision is rendered. 
(3) The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and 
regulations are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the 
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal. 
Utah Code Ann. S 10-9-1001 (1953, as amended 1992) (emphasis 
added)• 
10-9-103. Definitions - Notice. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(c) "Conditional use" means a land use that, 
because of its unique characteristics or 
potential impact on the municipality, 
surrounding neighbors, or adjacent land uses, 
may not be compatible in some areas or may be 
compatible only if certain conditions are 
required that mitigate or eliminate the 
detrimental impacts• 
Utah Code Ann. S 10-9-103(1)(c) (as amended 1992). 
10-9-407. Conditional Uses. 
(1) A zoning ordinance may contain provisions 
for conditional uses that may be allowed, 
allowed with conditions, or denied in 
designated zoning districts based on 
compliance with standards and criteria set 
forth in the zoning ordinance for those uses. 
Utah Code Ann. S 10-9-407(1) (as amended 1991). 
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40-27-03 CONDITIONAL USES 
The following uses and structures are permitted in 
the R-M-15 Zone only after a Conditional Use 
Permit has been approved by the Planning 
Commission and subject to the terms and conditions 
thereof: 
USE NO. USE CLASSIFICATION 
1112 Single family dwellings - attached. 
(In approved Planned Unit Development only.) 
1131 Multiple-family dwelling. 
* * * * * 
Accessory uses and buildings customarily 
incidental to the above. 
Murray City Ordinance § 40-27-03 (relevant portions). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 1, 1992, the Murray City Planning Commission 
approved a conditional use permit for Oak Financial Services, 
Inc. to construct a 24-unit multi-family complex consisting of 
three or four bedroom apartments. Murray City Ordinance requires 
commencement of substantial work on the conditional use site 
within one year of approval of the permit. Without commencing 
construction pursuant to the 24-unit conditional use permit, Oak 
Financial submitted a new application for a conditional use 
permit to construct a 68-unit complex on the original site and 
adjoining property. The Planning Commission denied that 
application on January 6, 1994. Oak subsequently appealed the 
Planning Commission decision to the City Council which held a 
public hearing on April 26, 1994, upheld the Planning Commission 
decision and denied the application. 
On June 9, 1994, nearly two months after the final denial of 
the 68-unit application, Murray City advised Oak Financial that a 
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building permit would not be issued for the 24-unit project 
because no substantial work had been commenced in the 20 months 
since project approval and Oak had not requested or received an 
extension pursuant to the applicable City ordinance. The City 
reasonably concluded Oak Financial had abandoned its 24-unit 
project in favor of the 68-unit proposal. 
On June 24, 1994, Oak filed a complaint requesting judicial 
review of Murray City's actions related to both conditional use 
permits. On cross-motions for summary judgment and pursuant to 
statute, the trial court reviewed the record which was before the 
Planning Commission and the City Council and concluded that (1) 
the decisions of Murray City were not arbitrary, capricious or 
illegal and (2) the undisputed facts do not establish Oak's claim 
to a building permit for the 24-unit complex. 
The matter is now before this Court on appeal from the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment for Murray City. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Due to the nature of this appeal, the scope and standards of 
review, and for other reasons set forth below, Appellees 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Murray City" or the 
"City") object to a substantial portion of Appellant's 
(hereinafter "Oak") statement of facts to the extent that: 
1, Statements which are argumentative, conclusory or 
improperly characterize the evidence contrary to the facts of 
record. For example, statements suggesting that Murray City's 
staff "encouraged," "induced," or otherwise attempted to affect 
4 
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Other argumentative characterizations run throughout Oak's 
statements. For example, the assertion that Oak's traffic 
engineer, present at the appeal before the City Council, "became 
suddenly ill due to the strain of standing for two hours in the 
heat of the standing-room-only crowd left before the new traffic 
concerns were voiced" (Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-17) is not 
supported by the record citation which states simply: 
Mr. Preston stated to his knowledge this 
is the first time the question has been 
raised and Mr. Blair, the only one who can 
answer the question, has left the meeting. 
(R 345.) The Council was not informed why Mr. Blair left the 
hearing. 
The traffic engineer was present earlier 
during the public hearing, but for 
unexplained reasons left before the hearing 
concluded. 
(Finding No. 19, R 562.) 
4. Characterizations of the public comments and written 
submissions from members of the public which have been framed in 
a manner to imply or suggest, without any other evidence, that 
the Murray City Planning Commission or Murray City Council relied 
on such comments in rendering a decision are inaccurate and 
inappropriate. 
The facts material to this appeal are those which were 
before the Murray City Council in its evaluation of Oak's appeal, 
including, but not limited to, the following: 
1. Murray City's zoning ordinance allows multi-family 
dwellings in the R-M-15 zone "only after a Conditional Use Permit 
6 
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8. After consideration of the record and public comments 
and evaluation of the cumulative effects of the proposed 68-unit 
project, the City Council voted to deny the conditional use 
permit and to enter findings and conclusions reflecting the basis 
for its decision. (R 350.) (The Findings and Conclusions are 
present in the record at R 181-85 and also at R 559-563. See 
also Addendum A attached.) 
9. Additional information presented to the City Council 
regarding the impact of Oak's proposed project on the Liberty 
Elementary School included: (1) a letter dated January 27, 1994, 
from Murray City School District Business Administrator Richard 
Clark (R 565-66), (2) Murray City School District Classroom Space 
Projections (R 569), (3) a letter dated January 3, 1994, from the 
Liberty Elementary Site Based Decision-Making Community Group 
(R 570-71), and (4) a memorandum to the Liberty Elementary Site 
Based Decision-Making Community Group from Steven K. Hirase, 
Supervisor of Special Education, dated January 14, 1994, 
(R 572-73). 
10. The proposed project would generate approximately 7,500 
to 8,000 additional motor vehicle trips per week, with all of 
those vehicle trips requiring either a left-hand or right-hand 
turn through one (1) public access drive entrance on 6100 South, 
without the benefit of any traffic control devices (Findings 
Nos. 15 and 16, R 561, supported by the Site Plan, R 386, Telus 
Study, R 388 and Planning and Zoning minutes). 
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Zoning Ordinance, § 40-11-06 (Findings and Conclusions at p. 5, 
R 562-63). 
17. The Murray City Zoning Ordinance, § 40-11-10, provides 
that a conditional use permit shall expire "unless there is 
substantial action under a conditional use permit within a 
maximum of one (1) year of its issuance . . . " The Planning 
Commission may grant an extension of up to six months when deemed 
to be in the public interest. (R 482-83.) 
18. Oak was advised by Murray City on June 9, 1994, that a 
building permit would not be issued for the 24-unit project 
because no substantial work had been commenced since the project 
was approved, no extension was requested or granted, and the 
conditional use permit expired by its terms on or about 
October 1, 1993. (R 480-81.) 
19. In addition, the plans submitted for a building permit 
for the 24-unit project showed structures of a different 
footprint, design and location from those which had been 
originally approved by the Planning Commission, raising an 
additional question as to whether the City would have been able 
to issue a building permit pursuant to the conditional use 
permit. (R 480-81.) 
20. Without citing from the substantial number of written 
and verbal comments made to the Planning Commission and the City 
Council, it is important to note that the selective comments 
cited by Oak as facts illustrating the alleged economic and 
racial discrimination are not representative of the comments made 
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The evidence before Murray City is sufficient to reasonably 
lead to the conclusion that the proposed 68-unit project would 
create a significant adverse impact on the community. There is 
no evidence from which one could reasonably conclude that the 
City reacted to public clamor, discriminatory or otherwise. 
Because there is substantial evidence in the record supporting 
the City's denial, it is clear that the City did not act 
arbitrarily or capriciously. 
The evidence does not paint a picture of economic or racial 
discrimination amounting to an equal protection violation. The 
City does not have a bias against low-income, minority housing. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that it had previously approved 
the smaller, 24-unit, affordable housing project. The evidence 
clearly shows that discriminatory factors were not present in the 
City's decision. 
Unfortunately, Oak can no longer commence construction on 
its 24-unit project because it failed to meet the requirements of 
the ordinance under which that conditional use permit was issued. 
Oak essentially abandoned the 24-unit project in favor of its 
attempts to obtain approval for the 68-unit project. It did not 
commence work on the 24-unit project within the required one year 
period nor did it request or obtain an extension of time. 
Pursuant to the clear and unambiguous provisions of the 
controlling ordinance, the conditional use permit lapsed and can 
no longer be the basis for issuance of a building permit. 
12 
i n c C i r * •- • ^ r h i f r ^ r ^ v - i . - ^ . - i y nor 
C i t y ' s d e n i a , i * e 6 8 - u n i t con G l i d i n g p e r m i t s 
f o r cue ^ 4 - u n i c p r - ^ e c t . 
Ill 'IUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
.o*.^ ^^ appeal e s s e n t i a l l y 
J c o n d i t i o n a l a ,e , r r:: * i a r r ^ y V_*L; ^ a e r u a ^ "*"Krt 
••i -n=*t-i^  -. > « : .»^tual suppor t a c t u a l b a s i s 
f 
clan,- r ' ; . s c r ^nunatoi
 z *„% . v . » 
-•^-^ro*-^s * i nancp including that a^ was *.*: 
e 
Murray - - mtends *..,..*. .... . appiicdixon lor 
conditional use was an appropriate exercise of discretion under 
sta 111 ' •' 11 i i I • ' i " 11 » i " *'' I«I1111 11 11 i mi a r t U r i i I i' I » * ' t "i I 
upon t h e e v i d e n c e pc etunint nui ill I he i e c o r d ut LIHL1 p o t e n t i a l 
a d v e r s e impact of I he p r o j e c t on t h e community, T h i s d e n i a l was 
no! hrtsHil 111 M HI (list i i in i iin I ui y UUIIIIIILIIL.JI I i urn L i l i ^u i ib 1 ILI IL i s 
r a t i uiiiiii I I y s u p p o r t e d in t h e rwi iiillll I Imiay1 i . i ly (mrl.hei 
t h a t Oak had abandoned i t s p r e v i o u s l y approved 2 4 - u n i t p r o j e c t in 
f a v o r rt t h e r w | "oposiil and 'had f a i l e d !"i commence work on t h e 
p r o j e c t caus ing Lin. pi Lur appi u'J.i 1 I i xp i i i in, 11 i i i iiiii.i 
11 ili a t t e m p t e d t o li-ivn t h e t r i a l cour t s u b s t i t u t e i t s 
judgment fo* uiiat o i l o c a l d e c i s i o n makers i n an a r e a where t h e y 
13 
are afforded considerable discretion and where their decisions 
are cloaked with a statutory presumption of validity. On appeal, 
Oak embraces the same strategy. Because of the applicable 
standard of review, however, this Court should not substitute its 
judgment for Murray City's evaluation of the facts and may only 
determine whether the facts in the record provide support for the 
decision reached by the City. 
Oak's argument that the decision of Murray City to deny the 
68-unit conditional use permit somehow violates the federal and 
state constitutional guarantees of equal protection represents an 
unwarranted expansion of the nature of the judicial review 
contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3). That provision, 
while allowing a person adversely affected by a local land use 
decision to file a petition asking for judicial review to 
determine whether the decision is "arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal," does not contemplate the creation of an umbrella under 
which the court conducts an independent inquiry regarding every 
conceivable alternative theory of liability under federal and 
state constitutional, statutory or common law principles. The 
limited judicial review of the "legality" of a local land use 
decision under the standard of Utah Code Ann. S 10-9-1001 is 
clearly intended to focus on procedural requirements and legal 
sufficiency under applicable statutes and ordinances (see, e.g., 
Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 609 
(Utah App. 1995). There is no logical stopping place to the 
expansion of that inquiry as suggested by Oak, which serves only 
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to confuse the issues before the Court regarding an otherwise 
fairly simple and straightforward review of the record in support 
of this decision regarding the denial of a conditional use 
permit. 
A review of the record points toward at least two general 
conclusions. First, the allegedly discriminatory citizen 
comments comprise only a small portion of the public input which 
Murray City received and reviewed. There is certainly no factual 
support for the conclusion that Murray City responded solely to 
discriminatory public clamor. Second, there is sufficient 
factual basis for Murray City to conclude that a potentially 
adverse impact of this project on the community supported the 
decision to deny the conditional use permit. 
POINT I 
A CONDITIONALLY PERMITTED USE IS ONE WHICH, 
BY DEFINITION, MAY NOT BE COMPATIBLE IN ALL 
AREAS OF A PARTICULAR ZONE AND I S THEREFORE 
NOT AN ENTITLEMENT, BUT MAY BE DENIED UNDER 
APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES1 
A. EVALUATION OF WHETHER A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT SHOULD BE 
APPROVED I S BASED UPON THE IMPACT OF THAT PARTICULAR USE, AT 
THE SPECIFIC SITE FOR WHICH IT IS PROPOSED. 
By i t s very d e f i n i t i o n , a condit ional use may have 
s u f f i c i e n t impact on a municipality or a neighborhood that i t may 
-
7It i s important to note at the outset that t h i s Court can and probably 
should deal with t h i s matter without unnecessarily addressing the issue of 
whether the approval of a conditional use permit i s discretionary or an 
entit lement. Because Appellants have made the i r argument for entitlement so 
strongly, Murray City feels compelled to brief the issue, even though i t i s 
not disposi t ive or even essen t ia l . 
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not be compatible with its surroundings, even though it may be 
allowed by a local zoning ordinance. 
"Conditional use* means a land use that, 
because of its unique characteristics or 
potential impact on the municipality, 
surrounding neighbors, or adjacent land uses, 
may not be compatible in some areas or may be 
compatible only if certain conditions are 
required that mitigate or eliminate the 
detr imenta1 impacts. 
Utah Code Ann S 10-9-103(1)(c) (emphasis added). 
A zoning ordinance may contain provisions for 
conditional uses that may be allowed, allowed 
with conditions, or denied in designated 
zoning districts, based on compliance with 
standards and criteria set forth in the 
zoning ordinance for those uses. 
Utah Code Ann § 10-9-407(1) (emphasis added). 
If a zoning board finds that a use is not 
desirable at a particular location, a permit 
for use can be withheld despite the fact that 
the use conforms with legislated standards. 
Ziegler, 3 Rathkopf's Law of Zoning and Planning, 4 ed S 42-07[8] 
at p. 41-93, emphasis added. In other words, the decision to 
grant or deny an application for a conditional use permit 
necessarily involves the exercise of some discretion and a 
conditional use approval is not automatically granted merely 
because the particular zoning category may designate the use for 
which the permit is requested as conditionally allowed. A zoning 
body may evaluate the impact of a proposed use on the surrounding 
community and exercise its discretion in determining whether that 
impact justifies granting or denying the conditional use permit. 
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Murray City's Zoning Ordinance permits multiple family 
dwellings in an R-M-15 zone, "only after a Conditional Use Permit 
has been approved by the Planning Commission." Murray City 
Zoning Ordinance § 40-27-03. There is no language in the 
ordinance which creates an entitlement to a particular use. Nor 
does the ordinance create any presumption of entitlement based 
upon the advice or recommendation of the planning staff. The 
ordinance clearly provides that approval comes only from the 
Planning Commission. It is the Planning Commission which must 
evaluate all of the technical information and recommendations 
along with evidence of impact on a neighborhood in order to reach 
a conclusion whether to issue the conditional use permit. 
B. EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT IS 
BASED ON THE CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF THE TOTALITY OF FACTS AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED. 
Oak places much emphasis on whether the streets surrounding 
the project have the capacity to accommodate the proposed 
development and whether the school district has the capacity to 
absorb the additional student population. There is no authority 
given to support the conclusion that this issue of capacity is 
the only, or even the controlling, factor in determining whether 
to grant a conditional use permit. The definition of conditional 
use focuses rather on the potential impact of the use "on the 
municipality, surrounding neighbors, or adjacent land 
uses . . . " § 10-9-103(1)(c). The purpose statement set forth 
in S 10-9-102 reflects a clear legislative intent to provide 
broad authority to municipalities "in order to provide for the 
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health, safety, and welfare, and promote the prosperity, improve 
the morals, peace and good order, comfort, convenience, and 
aesthetics of the municipality . . . M 
If an applicant for a conditionally permitted use could 
claim an entitlement as a matter of right merely because of a 
particular zoning classification, that would emasculate the 
discretion clearly afforded to local land use decision makers by 
the provisions of the Municipal Land Use Development and 
Management Act in evaluating the potential detrimental impacts of 
such a proposed use. 
Contrary to Oak's assertions, approval of a conditional use 
permit is not an entitlement. An application for conditional use 
may be properly denied due to an impact on the community which 
makes that particular use incompatible with the location for 
which it is proposed. It is within the discretion of Murray City 
to make this evaluation. 
POINT II 
THERE I S SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
WHICH WAS BEFORE THE MURRAY CITY COUNCIL TO 
SUPPORT THE CITY'S DENIAL OF THE CONDITIONAL 
USE PERMIT BASED UPON ITS POTENTIAL ADVERSE 
IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY. 
The s t a n d a r d of a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w of a l a n d u s e d e c i s i o n i s 
g o v e r n e d by Utah Code Ann § 1 0 - 9 - 1 0 0 1 . P a t t e r s o n v . Utah County 
Bd of A d j u s t m e n t , 893 P .2d 602, 603 (Utah App. 1995) J' The 
-Patterson dealt with an appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann S 17-27-708 of 
a board of adjustment decision. The language of § 17-27-708 i s nearly 
ident ical to the applicable provisions in § 10-9-1001, making the same 
standard appropriate here. 
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appellate court reviews the decision by the municipality as 
though it had come directly and not on appeal from the trial 
court. Id. In this case, the court may only decide if Murray 
City's actions, based upon the record before the City, were 
arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Id. The City is afforded 
substantial deference and its actions carry a statutory 
presumption of validity. 
[T]he Board's actions are accorded 
substantial deference and will be rejected on 
appeal only if they are so unreasonable as to 
be arbitrary and capricious or if they 
violate the law. 
Patterson at 603. See also Cottonwood Heights Citizens Ass'n v. 
Bd of Commrs. 593 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 1979) (courts should not 
interfere with land use decisions "unless it is shown that there 
is no reasonable basis to justify the action taken.") 
This Court has recently stated that it will not substitute 
its judgment for that of local land use agencies and will find 
local actions to be arbitrary or capricious only where no 
substantial evidence exists to support the decision. Patterson 
at 604. 
We must simply determine, in light of the 
evidence before the [local agency], whether a 
reasonable mind could reach the same 
conclusion as the [local agency]. It is not 
our prerogative to weigh the evidence anew. 
Patterson at 604 (emphasis added). See also Gayland v. Salt Lake 
County, 358 P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 1961) (the fact that the evidence 
could have led to a contrary decision does not lead to the 
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conclusion that the decision which was made is not supported by 
the evidence)• 
The analysis on appeal is two-pronged and fairly simple: (1) 
What picture does a totality of the evidence before Murray City 
present? (2) Could a reasonable person have concluded from the 
evidence that Oak's 68-unit project would cause an adverse impact 
on the community? Before the Court approaches this analysis, 
however, it must determine whether Oak has properly marshaled the 
evidence in support of the City's decision prior to challenging 
the adequacy of the evidence. Patterson at 605; VanLeeuwen v. 
Indus. Comm'n.. 270 UAR 13, 14 (Utah App. 1995). 
A. INCREASED TRAFFIC TO AND FROM THE PROPOSED PROJECT 
CONSTITUTED A SUBSTANTIAL POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY. 
Oak has argued that the City's conclusions were not 
supported by substantial evidence and were legally insufficient. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 24). This argument conveniently ignores 
the other evidence that was considered in addition to the 
tailored evidence prepared and presented on behalf of Oak. A 
good example of this appears in the evidence of traffic impact on 
the community. 
The engineering reports presented to the City addressed only 
the limited issue of the capacity of 6100 South to accommodate 
additional traffic load. In addition, the traffic study obtained 
by Oak failed to address the impact of traffic on the 
intersection of 6100 South with State Street, a major 
intersection which already has significant traffic flow and 
control problems. (R 561-62; R 345; R 403-04.) 
20 
The issue of the capacity of 6100 South to accommodate 
additional traffic was only one of several factors examined by 
the City leading to the conclusion that the proposed project 
would create "excessive and unsafe traffic conditions." (R 563.) 
The City considered a computer traffic analysis of eastbound and 
westbound traffic on 6100 South from October 25, 1993, through 
October 27, 1993. (R 588-95.) This analysis indicated that 
54.31 percent of westbound traffic and 67.14 percent of eastbound 
traffic exceeded the posted speed limit of 25 mph. During the 
48-hour sampling period, 167 vehicles passed through the study 
area at speeds of 45 mph or higher (one at 70 mph westbound and 
one at 75 mph eastbound). 
One of the comments most commonly made by citizens, verbally 
or written, is that the increased traffic posed an increased risk 
to neighborhood children and to students attending Liberty 
Elementary School. The City considered evidence that the project 
would generate 7,500 to 8,000 additional motor vehicle trips per 
week, all of which would be channeled through a single public 
access driveway. (R 561, R 386, R 388.) The City considered 
evidence projecting a 70 percent increase in traffic along 
6100 South along with a significant increase in traffic 
accidents. (R 574.) The City also considered the likelihood 
that an increase in traffic traveling along 6100 South would 
result in a significant increase in the number of vehicles 
traveling well above the posted speed limit. 
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Clearly, the traffic impact resulting from the proposed 
project includes more than the isolated issue of whether the 
streets can accommodate the increased traffic. While it is 
impossible to quantify the safety risk, especially to children, 
posed by the increased traffic, that increase, as well as other 
traffic-related problems, is an impact which was properly 
considered by the City. The evidence considered by Murray City 
clearly supports its conclusion that there was a significant, 
potentially adverse, impact on the community. 
B. COMPATIBILITY WITH SURROUNDING RESIDENTIAL USES AND 
NEIGHBORHOOD. 
It is appropriate for Murray City to consider the potential 
impact on surrounding neighbors and adjacent land uses in 
determining whether to approve an application for a conditional 
use permit. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-103(1)(c). Aside from the 
safety impact posed by increased traffic, 7,500 to 8,000 
additional weekly motor vehicle trips, or over 1,000 additional 
trips per day, justify an inquiry into what other impacts 
increased traffic may have on the neighbors and their property. 
In addition, Murray City examined the impact of 68 
additional multi-family units on its targeted housing inventory 
goals under its master plan. It determined that the City had 
already exceeded the percentage (40%) of its total housing 
inventory targeted for rental property. (R 336.) Given this and 
the fact that the neighborhood already had other multi-family 
units (R 125), the City properly concluded that an additional 
high-density development of 68 units in the same area would have 
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an adverse impact making it incompatible with the neighborhood. 
Oak's analysis completely ignores this important factor, which 
was presented to and considered by the Murray City Council in 
support of its decision. 
C. THE IMPACT ON LIBERTY ELEMENTARY SCHOOL. 
Another concern voiced by the large majority of citizens was 
the potential impact of a high density apartment complex on the 
neighborhood school. Oak argues that "The uncontroverted 
evidence showed that Oak's project would add only 61 students— 
barely enough to begin raising the issue of Liberty's capacity." 
(Appellant's Brief p. 38). Oak's citation to the record does not 
show this to be "uncontroverted evidence." In fact, the citation 
is to a City Council finding that "Oak Financial projected that 
the project would add an estimated 61 elementary students to the 
Liberty Elementary School . . . " (R 561.) There appears to be 
no underlying evidence and the finding is only that the number 
was Oak's projection. That projection appears to be self-serving 
and substantially low, given the fact that the project would 
consist of 68 units with three and four bedrooms. There was no 
competent evidence before the City to support the claimed minimal 
school population increase.-7 
Taking the same narrow approach to impact on schools as it 
took on traffic impact, Oak argues that the issue of impact must 
be decided on whether the school district has the capacity to 
-'Even if the estimate were accurate, it is important to keep in mind 
that as a percentage increase, 61 additional students is a significant 
increase in student population for an elementary school. 
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accommodate additional students and not whether the capacity of a 
particular school is impacted. (Appellant's Brief p. 36). This 
argument ignores the fact that there are other impacts arising 
directly from an increase in school population which do not focus 
only on whether and where there may be desks to accommodate 
students. For example, the City considered a letter from Richard 
Clark, Business Administrator for Murray City School District. 
Mr. Clark reviewed the potential impact on Liberty Elementary as 
well as the possibility of bussing elementary students to another 
school. He noted, "boundary changes and bussing may be viewed as 
'disruptive' to those students and parents who are 
affected . . . " (R 510.) This is clearly an impact not 
directly related to the capacity of the schools to accept 
additional students. 
The City also considered evidence of impact from other 
sources. For example, in a memorandum letter dated January 14, 
1994, Steven K. Hirase, Supervisor of Special Education for 
Murray City School District, discussed problems associated with 
the impact of additional students on special education services 
at Liberty Elementary. (R 572-73.) It is reasonable to conclude 
from Mr. Hirase's memorandum that Oak's project would likely 
increase special education needs at Liberty Elementary without 
providing a basis for increased resources to meet those needs. 
In addition, the City considered a letter from the Liberty 
Elementary Site Based Decision-Making Community Group which 
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outlined concerns related to specific impacts on the school which 
would result from approval of Oak's project. (R 570-71.) 
Oak argues that the school district "declined to oppose the 
project" as though that position indicated support. In fact, the 
school board recognized that it was acting as an information 
source and that it was not the board's duty to take a position on 
the project. 
Sherry Madsen agreed that the Board shouldn't 
take a position on the project. Margaret 
Nelson indicated that it is the District's 
responsibility to provide accurate 
information that can have a definite impact 
on the city making a decision, but feels it 
is not right to take a position. 
(R 516.) 
The City relied on all of this and other objective 
information in evaluating the potential impact of the project on 
the educational system in general and on Liberty Elementary in 
particular. It is unreasonable for Oak to conclude that the 
City's determination that Liberty Elementary and its students 
would be unfavorably impacted was factually unsupported and that 
"The only basis for the Council's decision were unfounded 
allegations by neighbors that the project would flood the schools 
with low-achieving, high-risk students." (R 230, Appellant's 
Brief p. 39) 
The evidence before the City was sufficient to lead to the 
City's conclusion that there was a high probability the proposed 
project would create an adverse impact on the neighborhood. 
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D. THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE REASONABLY SUPPORTS THE 
CONCLUSION THAT APPROVAL OF THE CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT WOULD 
RESULT IN AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE NEIGHBORHOOD AND 
ADJOINING LAND USES. 
The point which Murray City recognized and which Oak does 
not seem to understand is that the City's evaluation of impact on 
the neighborhood is not limited to evaluating each problem area 
and assigning a condition or restriction in an attempt to deal 
with that problem. The issue of impact, at bottom line, is 
whether a given conditional use, along with appropriate 
conditions and restrictions, still results overall in an adverse 
impact on the community. Germane to this entire discussion of 
impact is the undisputed fact that the City had already given its 
approval to a conditional use permit to construct a 24-unit 
complex of three and four bedroom apartments which would house 
the same type of residents as the larger project. The City had 
determined that the smaller project would not adversely impact 
the neighborhood and that the use could be permitted. 
The rationale behind the distinction between projects is 
easy for any reasonable person to see. The traffic, neighborhood 
and school impacts of the smaller project, though clearly impacts 
to the community, were not enough to be characterized as 
negative. When the proposal was increased by over two and one-
half times, however, the impacts took on a substantially more 
negative nature. 
In evaluating the totality of the evidence of the impacts 
from the larger project, it is reasonable to conclude, as did 
Murray City, that the adverse impact on the community weighed 
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against approval of the conditional use. In the exercise of its 
discretion and reliance on substantial evidence in the record 
before it, Murray City has not acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 
POINT H I 
MURRAY CITY DID NOT RESPOND TO PUBLIC CLAMOR, 
DISCRIMINATORY OR OTHERWISE, NOR DID IT ACT 
ILLEGALLY IN DENYING THE CONDITIONAL USE 
PERMIT. 
Oak argues that Murray City's denial of the conditional use 
permit was illegal for two reasons: (1) it was based upon public 
clamor of a discriminatory nature; and (2) it denied equal 
protection because it was racially and economically 
discriminatory. Neither of these arguments is supported by the 
evidence or by appropriate law. 
A. MURRAY CITY DID NOT IMPROPERLY BASE ITS DECISION TO DENY 
OAK'S APPLICATION FOR A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT ON PUBLIC 
CLAMOR 
Oak relies heavily on Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 
P.2d 704 (Utah App. 1988) in support of its arguments that Murray 
City inappropriately responded to "public clamor" in making its 
decision to deny the conditional use permit. It is important to 
note at the outset that Davis is clearly distinguishable and does 
not control here. In Davis, the city denied a conditional use 
permit "refusing to give any reason for its decision." Davis at 
705. Because there was no rationale given for the decision, the 
trial court was unable to determine whether there was evidence, 
other than the public outcry, reasonably supporting the decision. 
The trial court concluded that the city had acted in an 
arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory fashion because "there 
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was no rational or reasonable basis to deny the permit." The 
Court of Appeals agreed. 
In the present case, Murray City clearly considered and 
evaluated a substantial volume of information, admittedly 
including public comments. However, the public comments were 
only a portion of the evidentiary basis for the decision. In 
addition, Murray City entered findings of fact and conclusions 
which clearly indicate that the decision was carefully considered 
and appropriately based. 
Oak's argument that the City's denial of the permit was 
based on public opposition rather than competent evidence 
contains at least two critical flaws. First, public comment is 
an acceptable and required element in the consideration of land 
use issues. In fact, public notice and participation are 
statutorily created rights which are judicially enforceable. 
E.g.. Citizen's Awareness Now v. Marakis. 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 
1994). Second, the facts simply do not support Oak's argument. 
The public has a right to comment on land use issues and it 
is entirely proper for a municipality to give some weight to 
those comments. Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440, 445 
(Utah 1981). Public notice of zoning actions and public hearings 
are required by statute and ordinance. E.g., Utah Code Ann. 
S 10-9-103(2). To provide the required notice and permit 
citizens to attend a public hearing only to subsequently ignore 
the input of concerned citizens would make a mockery of the 
provisions of such statutes and ordinances and runs contrary to 
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our fundamental notions of democratic government. One of the 
problems with public hearings is that citizens exercising their 
first amendment rights might make comments which are 
inappropriate or of no value in the decision-making process. The 
very nature of an open hearing and the composition of our society 
make discriminatory and derogatory comments at a public hearing a 
likelihood. Merely because such comments were made, however, 
does not support the conclusion that they were a basis, much less 
the primary basis# for the decision of Murray City to deny Oak's 
application. 
Oak's emphasis on the discriminatory nature of some of the 
public comments improperly and incorrectly paints a picture of a 
community responding to what it perceives to be the evils of low 
income housing. Oak fails to recognize that this argument is at 
odds with the fact that, as discussed above, the smaller 24-unit, 
low-income project was approved with almost no public opposition. 
In the case of the larger project, opposition was strong, but not 
necessary discriminatory. A review of some of public comment the 
forms (R 575-87) provides a more balanced view of the type of 
citizen input received by the City. Analysis of these examples 
identifies numerous legitimate concerns over increased traffic, 
the safety of children, compatibility with neighboring uses, and 
impact on the neighborhood elementary school. The vast majority 
of these forms as well as the comments made at the public 
hearings contain no statements of a discriminatory nature. 
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It is important to keep in mind that the right of citizens 
to comment on governmental actions is one of the most fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the United States and Utah constitutions, 
Murray City and its agencies have no control over the content of 
such comments. Any attempt to exercise such control would 
clearly violate the citizens' freedom of speech. Any attempt by 
the City to ignore, i.e. fail to review and evaluate, the 
comments would be a de facto deprivation of the citizens' right 
to be heard by their government. 
The mere fact that derogatory or discriminatory comments may 
have been made and that the City reviewed or listened to those 
comments is clearly insufficient to lead to a conclusion that the 
City made its decision on the basis of those comments. 
Though public comment may not be the sole basis for 
determining whether to issue or deny a conditional use permit, 
44there is no impropriety in the solicitation of, or reliance 
upon, information which may be furnished by other landowners in 
the vicinity of the subject property at a public hearing." 
Thurston at 445. Where the input of the community was advisory 
in nature rather than conclusive, consideration of that input is 
proper. Id. Only where, as in Davis, there is no reasonable 
explanation for a decision to deny a permit or where there is no 
factual basis in the record supporting a decision to deny, would 
it be reasonable to conclude that a decision to deny was based on 
"public clamor.* Davis at 712 and cases cited therein. However, 
if the decision to deny is supported by evidence in the record, 
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there is no basis for a conclusion that the denial was improperly 
based upon community opposition, discriminatory in nature or 
otherwise. 
As discussed above, there is sufficient evidence in the 
record, aside from the public comments, to support Murray City's 
decision to deny the conditional use permit. That evidence makes 
this case clearly distinguishable from Davis. By stark contrast, 
there is simply no evidence to support Oak's conclusion that 
denial was based solely on "public clamor." 
B. MURRAY CITY'S DENIAL OF THE CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT DID NOT 
VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS. 
It is unfortunate that frequently when a party receives an 
adverse ruling before an administrative agency or trial court, 
the terms "due process" and "equal protection" are loosely thrown 
about in an attempt to create an issue on appeal which might 
overcome the fundamental weakness of that party's position. That 
appears to have happened in this case. 
Before the trial court, Oak briefed, as an apparent 
afterthought in its reply memorandum, an argument that Murray 
City's land use decision violated equal protection as being 
racially and economically discriminatory. This issue appears on 
its face to be tangential, not supported by the facts and was not 
argued at oral argument before the trial court. In addition, as 
previously indicated, this entire issue exceeds the limited scope 
of judicial review contemplated under Utah Code Ann. S 10-9-1001. 
In its Appellant's Brief, Oak jumps into the legal arguments 
related to equal protection without identifying anything more 
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than a speculative, conclusory "feeling" that the City acted in a 
discriminatory way. Lacking factual support, the legal arguments 
of equal protection violations dissolve. The equal protection 
issue before this court can easily be dealt with by identifying 
the facts, actually the lack of facts, which are material to the 
legal conclusion. 
As noted above and worth repeating here is the undisputed 
fact that Murray City approved the 24-unit complex. Oak 
conveniently ignores the fact that the population which would 
have occupied the 68-unit complex is comprised of the same 
individuals who would have occupied the 24-unit complex. What is 
the difference between the two proposed projects? Not the 
proposed minority, low-income occupants. The only difference is 
the size of the projects and the increased potential impact of 
the larger project upon the community. To conclude that the 
City's denial of a permit for the larger project was 
discriminatory flies in the face of the evidence. 
Oak argues, with considerable citation to authority, that 
the effect of Murray City's action is discriminatory. This is a 
specious argument. If there is a discriminatory effect, that 
discrimination is solely a matter of degree—the difference 
between the number of low-income minorities who would occupy the 
24-unit complex and the number of low-income minorities who could 
occupy the 68-unit complex. The logical conclusion of Oak's 
equal protection argument is absurd. For example, if Oak were to 
acquire five acres adjoining its existing property and apply for 
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a permit for 130 units, the City could not deny the permit on the 
basis of a clearly adverse impact on the neighborhood because the 
denial would result in discrimination. The same would be true 
regardless of the size of the project—200, 300, 400 units. It 
is unthinkable and improper to apply the law of equal protection 
to reach this absurdity. 
POINT IV 
THE CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT FOR THE 24-UNIT 
DEVELOPMENT EXPIRED BY ITS TERMS. OAK IS NOT 
NOW ENTITLED TO A BUILDING PERMIT BASED UPON 
THAT CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. 
Oak argues that Murray City erroneously interpreted its 
statute in denying building permits based upon the expired 
conditional use permit. Interestingly, Oak fails to provide any 
facts with supporting evidence to show that it had commenced 
substantial work on the project.-7 The unsupported facts it 
alleges could as well indicate activities undertaken in 
anticipation of approval of the 68-unit project. There is 
nothing in the record which would evidence the commencement of 
the 24-unit project. In fact, given the evidence which indicates 
the original project was abandoned in favor of the 68-unit 
project, it is more reasonable to conclude that any expenditures 
by Oak were related to the larger project and not made in 
reliance on the permit for the smaller project. 
-Oak states that the Murray City Planning Staff induced it to postpone 
work on the 24-unit project. (Appellant's Brief p. 47). The citation to the 
record is not to evidence supporting this claim, but merely to an unsupported 
allegation in Oak's complaint. 
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The material facts are fairly straightforward. On 
October 1, 1992, Murray City approved Oak's application for a 
conditional use permit for the 24-unit project. As soon as that 
approval was obtained, Oak changed the nature of the project. 
Immediately after the October 1, 1992 CUP was 
approved, plaintiff Oak began working with 
Murray City Planning Staff on a revised site 
plan for the subsequently-acquired adjacent 
property. 
(R 211.) 
Murray City Ordinance requires commencement of substantial 
work on the conditional use within one year of approval of the 
permit. By June 9, 1994, Oak had not commenced work on the 24-
unit project site. (R 480-81). Oak had never applied for or 
obtained an extension of the time to commence work. (R 480-81). 
A simple reading of the clear and unambiguous language of 
the ordinance leads to the reasonable conclusion that if (1) 
substantial work is not commenced within one year and (2) no 
extension of the one-year period is granted, the conditional use 
permit expires. 
Oak made an independent business decision to pursue a 
conditional use application for a larger project. At first, it 
pursued a revision to the 24-unit project. There is no factual 
or legal basis to conclude that an enlargement of and revision to 
the original project could have been approved without evaluation 
of a new conditional use application. Eventually, Oak abandoned 
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the site revision in favor of a new configuration requiring a new 
application for conditional use.-7 
Oak cites cases from other jurisdictions in support of its 
claim that it need not have begun construction to have complied 
with the one-year requirement. In Western Land Equities. Inc. v. 
Citv of Loaan, 617 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1980), the court clearly 
identified "the existence of some physical construction" as a 
critical element of the substantial reliance test in claiming 
estoppel. "Pre-construction activities such as the execution of 
architectural drawings or the clearing of land and widening of 
roads are not sufficient to create a vested right, nor generally 
are activities that are not exclusively related to the proposed 
project." Further, application of those cases depends upon 
unsupported allegations of activities allegedly undertaken toward 
commencement of the 24-unit project. Without facts to which the 
law may be applied, the legal arguments are irrelevant. 
Oak failed to take the required action to preserve its 
conditional use permit for the 24-unit project. Instead, it made 
an independent business decision to gamble on the possibility of 
obtaining a permit for a larger project and thereby abandoned the 
original permit causing it to lapse. There is no basis, in law 
or in fact, to force the City now to permit construction under 
the original 24-unit permit. 
-
7In either case, approval of a new application for conditional use was 
required. Expansion of the original project would not have been treated 
differently from the application for an entirely different project. In either 
case, the City was charged with evaluating the impact of the larger projects 
on the neighboring community. 
35 
CONCLUSION 
Murray City is accorded wide discretion and a statutory 
presumption of validity in its evaluation of an application for a 
conditional use permit. In this case, it has properly exercised 
that discretion in reviewing a substantial amount of input and 
determining that the proposed 68-unit project would pose a 
significant, potentially adverse, impact on the neighboring 
community. Any reasonable person reviewing the record could 
reach the same conclusion. Its denial, therefore, was neither 
arbitrary, capricious nor illegal. 
There is no evidence to support Oak's allegations that the 
denial of the 68-unit project was discriminatory. By contrast 
there is substantial evidence that the denial was based on other, 
nondiscriminatory impacts on the community. There is no 
violation of equal protection here and no illegality in denial of 
the application for a conditional use permit. 
As to denial of building permits for the lapsed conditional 
use permit for the 24-unit project, Murray City was merely 
applying the unambiguous terms of its ordinance. Despite Oak's 
characterizations of work allegedly performed or excuses for 
failing to commence the project, the applicable period of time 
lapsed and the permit expired by its terms. 
DATED this of December, 1995. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
By 
Jody K Burnett 
Attqy/neydl/for Defendants/ 
Appellees 
37784.1 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Beverly Riemann, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
in the law offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for defendants 
herein; that she served the attached BRIEF OF APPELLEE MURRAY 
CITY in Case No, 950520-CA before the Utah Court of Appeals, 
State of Utah, upon the parties listed below by placing a true 
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Counsel for Plaintiff 
Gordon Strachan 
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Old City Hall, Upstairs 
528 Main Street 
P. 0. Box 3747 
Park City, UT 84060-3747 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the <^0 -—day of December, 1995. 
Beverly Riemann •l nr 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this JZ day of 
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STEFANlFD TAYLOR | NOtArVPublic 
257 East 200 South «&~0 I ZTJ^ J% . J * . „ . . -,
 TL , Salt Lake city, Utah 84111 J Residing in the State of^  ytah 
My Commission Expires I 
Aprfl 14.1998 | 
StatB of Utah • 
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ADDENDUM A 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
THIS MATTER came on for hearing before the Murray City Munic-
ipal Council on the 26th day of April, 1994- The Municipal Coun-
cil finds as follows: 
1, Prior to October 7, 1993, Oak Financial submitted an 
application for a conditional use permit for the project which is 
the subject of this appeal. 
2. On October 7, 1993, a public hearing was held by the 
Murray City Planning and Zoning Commission. The notice of said 
public hearing was mailed to approximately 65 property owners who 
own property within 500 feet of the subject property. (Exhibit 
3 > l 
3. At said meeting on October 7, 1993, the Planning and 
Zoning Commission requested that the developers meet with a repre-
sentative member(s) of residents in the surrounding neighborhood 
regarding Oak's proposal. Representatives of Oak Financial met 
with the neighborhood committee twice in October 1993, once 
inNovember 1993, and once in early spring 1994. 
4, On January 6, 1994, the Planning and Zoning reconvened 
the public hearing? and, after lengthy presentations by the appli-
cants and surrounding property owners, residents and school offi-
All exhibits referred to in these Findings and Conclusions 
are those compiled by the City' Recorder and maintained in the 
Public Hearing File of Oak Financial in the office of the City 
Recorder, 
cials, the Planning and Zoning Commission unanimously voted to 
deny the application for a conditional use permit, (Exhibit 10) 
5, On January 7, 1994, the applicant filed a timely appeal 
to the Murray City Municipal Council. (Exhibit 17) 
6* Section 40-11-07 of the Murray City Zoning Ordinance 
provides that an appeal from a decision of the Planning Commis-
sion regarding conditional use permits be heard by the Municipal 
Council. 
7. On April 26, 1994, pursuant to notice, the Municipal 
Council held a public hearing to consider the appeal of Oak Finan-
cial. 
8. Proponents of the development submitted a new proposed 
site plan to the Municipal Council on April 26, 1994. Said new 
site plan included a grassy playground area, clubhouse and basket-
ball court. The turning radii were also modified to meet Murray 
City Fire Department requirements. 
9. The site plan, dated April 22, 1994, proposed five 
four-plex buildings and eight six-plexes for a total of 68 dwell-
ing units, each containing four bedrooms. (Exhibit 38) 
10. The subject property contains 5,64 acres and is zoned 
R-M-15 (residential-multiple family)• Residential Multiple Fami-
ly is a conditional use in that zone (See Chapter 4027 Murray 
City Zoning Ordinance). 
11. Approximately 150 people attended the public hearing 
and approximately 61 persons either presented oral statements or 
written comments. (Exhibit 57). 
12. Oak Financial presented approximately 15 minutes of 
factual information regarding the proposed site plan, the effect 
of use of Utah Housing Finance Agency affordable housing financ-
ing, and nature and character of the proposed revised site plan 
and project. (Page 2, Approved minutes.) 
13. Oak Financial projected that the project would add an 
estimated 61 elementary students to the Liberty Elementary School 
population which is currently at full capacity. (Exhibit 50) 
14. The proposed project would be located directly adjacent 
to Liberty Elementary School. 
15. The proposed project would generate approximately 7,500 
to 8,000 additional motor vehicle trips per week with all of 
those vehicle trips requiring either a left-hand or right-hand 
turn onto 6100 South without the benefit of any traffic control 
devices (P&Z Minutes, page 15/16). 
16. All vehicle traffic would travel through one public 
access drive entrance to the project. (See site plan, Exhibit 38) 
17. The proposed project contemplates only one access from 
the project onto 6100 South. This does not comply with the in-
tent of the adopted Murray City Transportation Plan. 
18. Such additional vehicle traffic would probably require 
modification to the traffic control devices at the intersection 
of 6100 South and State Street, all at public expense. 
19. The traffic engineer for the proponent was unavailable 
to answer questions by the Council during the public hearing at 
the time questions were raised about the effect of increased 
traffic on the intersection of 6100 South at State Street, which 
figures were not included in the traffic study prepared by Oak 
Financial's expert. The Lochner report noted the deficiency in 
Telus Traffic Study. Furthermore , said study did not take into 
consideration the effect of the proposed project on adjacent 
subdivision and streets such as Clear, Clay and Cedar. The traf-
fic engineer was present earlier during the public hearing, but 
for unexplained reasons left before the hearing concluded. 
20. The proponent of the development projected the number 
of residents in the project to be 296 residents, or 4.32 resi-
dents per unit. (City Council Minutes, page 2) 
21. In light of the need for ,faf fordable" housing, the 
estimate for the number of occupants is not credible. 
22. The projected population density per acre for the pro-
posed development is significantly higher than adjacent residen-
tial property. 
23. Applicant, pursuant to the request of the Planning and 
Zoning Commission, met with representative of the neighborhood 
concerning the proposed building and population density and to 
discuss potential development alternatives for the property. 
24. Applicant was unwilling to modify the proposed plan to 
reduce the project building or occupant density except, on or 
about April 22, 1994, to revise the site plan road layout and 
turning radii at the request of the Murray City Fire Department. 
CONCLUSIONS 
BASED ON the foregoing cumulative findings of fact, we, a 
majority of the members of the Municipal Council, do hereby con-
clude that the conditional use permit requested by Oak Financial 
be denied because the applicant has failed to meet its burden 
under Murray City Zoning Ordinance Section 40-11-06, paragraphs 
1, 2 and 3, to~wit: 
1. The proposed project, due to its occupant and building 
density, would be detrimental to the general well-being of the 
neighborhood by creating excessive and unsafe traffic conditions 
at the single drive access to and from the project and having an 
unknown effect on the intersection at 6100 South and State Street 
and impact of cut-through traffic on streets such as Clay, Cedar 
and Clear, endangering both vehicular and pedestrian traffic in 
the immediate vicinity. The traffic study prepared by Oak 
Financial's traffic expert is deficient in scope and conclusions. 
2. The proposed project, due to its occupant and building 
density, is not compatible with the surrounding residential uses 
in the neighborhood, 
3. The proposed project would have a negative impact on 
Liberty Elementary School by adding to a school population which 
is already at full capacity and by creating an excessive traffic 
hazard to school children arriving at and leaving the school 
grounds. 
DATED this 2.S^ day of May, 1994, 
MURRAY CITY MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 
JML umxL 
Lynn H.Vmrner, Chairman 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This i s t o c e r t i f y that a true and c o r r e c t copy of the 
F ind ings and Conclus ions was served upon Oak F i n a n c i a l S e r v i c e s , 
I n c . , 301 West 5400 south , Sui te 102, Murray, Utah 84107 by m a i l -
ing the same, pos tage p r e p a i d , t h i s <£ day o f ^ f e y 7 l 9 9 4 . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OAK FINANCIAL SERVICES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
REPORTERS TRANSCRIPT 
OF TELEPHONE 
CONFERENCE RULING 
Civil No. 940904079CV 
(Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson) 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 16th day of 
March, 1995, commencing at the approximate hour of 1:45 p.m., 
the above-entitled matter came on for hearing in the chambers 
area of Courtroom No. 502 of the Courts Building, 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge 
in the Third Judicial District, State of Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
GORDON C. STRACHAN, Attorney-at-Law, Strachan 
& Strachan, 528 Main Street, Post Office Box 3747, Park City, 
Utah 84060, telephone 649-4111, appearing telephonically and 
on behalf of the plaintiff. 
JODY K. BURNETT. Attorney-at-Law. Williams & 
Hunt, 257 East 200 South, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, telephone 521-5678, appearing telephonically and on 
behalf of the defendant. 
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(Whereupon, the following proceedings were 
had:) 
THE COURT: Do I have everybody? 
MR. STRACHAN: Gordon Strachan here, Your Honor. 
MR. BURNETT: Jody Burnett here, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'd like to give you my decision in 
this Oak versus Murray City case. I'll indicate to you that 
the reporter is present, and you're on a conference call, and 
he's taking everything down that's being said. 
MR. STRACHAN: Thank you. 
THE COURT: The Court is proceeding in this case as 
far as a review of this, the standard review that the Court 
must review with it and determine whether the decision made 
by the Murray City Council was arbitrary and capricious. 
I'm proceeding on the presumption that the decision 
16| was a valid decision with the burden on Oak to prove 
otherwise. 
Of course, based on your memoranda and review of 
the record is what the Court has done, and based on a review 
of what you have submitted to the Court. 
The Court would also indicate that I'm not going to 
place any judgment in the place of the local decision-makers; 
in other words, what I'm saying is where it's a close 
situation, then of course I'm giving deference to the 
decision of the local people at the time it was heard. 
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The Court would sustain the finding and conclusion 
reached by Murray City as to the impact on traffic, as to the 
impact on schools, and as to the impact it would have on the 
surrounding land and land uses. 
MR. STRACHAN: On traffic and schools, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. And the impact it would have on 
the surrounding land and land uses. The Court would further 
find that Murray City had a responsibility and obligation to 
protect the health, safety and welfare of the citizens, and 
that this was taken into consideration as far as their 
decision. 
That there was a certain amount of public clamor 
that took place, some of which was very emotional. But the 
Court does find that there are sufficient grounds other than 
the public clamor for the Murray City Council to make their 
decision, which they did. 
And I also find that Murray City had a 
responsibility to listen to the citizens. They had a 
responsibility to give notice to them and to have them come 
in, but of course not-ifo base their decision on the clamor. 
The Court also finds the evidence indicated that 
there was in Murray City 4 0 percent rental property, that 
18 percent of that was condominiums and 22 percent of that 
was apartments. 
I think that that would have a decision — or, a 
3 
1 bearing or be a factor on their decision, especially in going 
2 to the health and welfare of the citizens. 
3 The Court also finds under the conditional use 
4 permit, that's not automatic, but it is discretionary with 
5 the governing board, depending on the capability, based on 
6 the cumulative effect it would have on the adjacent land and 
7 land uses. 
8 And on that I do sustain, as I say, the Murray City 
9 findings. 
10 The Court also would deny the request by Oak to 
11 have the conditional use permit granted as far as the 
12 24 units are concerned. The Court finds on that that the 
13 statute does provide that there is a one-year period unless 
14 substantial work was done, and the Court finds that Oak did 
15 make an independent business decision and did proceed to go 
16 for the 68, and abandoned the 24 units as far as their work 
171 was done. 
18 There was a lot of work done, but it all went to 
19 the advancement of the 68 units. 
20 The Court would find that it would also benefit 
21 somewhat the 24 units, but it was designed to acquire the 
22 68 units. 
23 There was also some evidence, though I think this 
24 is in dispute, that the 24 units they're trying to get now 
2 5 are somewhat different than that which was proposed or what 
1 was proposed and approved originally, but the Court would 
2 deny on that also. Any questions? 
3 MR. BURNETT: No. 
4 MR. STRACHAN: No, I don't think I have any, Your 
5 Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Mr. Burnett, I would ask you to prepare 
7 the necessary order, and of course I'm sustaining their 
8 findings, but an order and findings as to what the Court 
9 found. 
10 MR. BURNETT: I will do so. If I could save myself 
11 another phone call, I would request Mr. Midgley to go ahead 
12 and prepare a transcript just of the announcement of your 
13 ruling today so that I could be sure that I have that 
14 reflected accurately. I would like to do that, and I presume 
15 Mr. Strachan would probably want to have that as well. If I 
16 could request that from Mr. Midgley and obtain that prior to 
17 the preparing of the findings, it would be a help. 
18 MR. STRACHAN: I would like a copy, but I would 
19 also like a copy, Mr. Midgley, of the hearing as well. 
2 0 MR. BURNETT: Thank you, Your Honor. 
21 MR. STRACHAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
23 (Whereupon, at the hour of 1:55 p.m., the 
24 proceedings came to a close.) 
25 
II 
2 
3 | REPORTERS CERTIFICATE 
4 
5 1 I, ED MIDGLEY, Official Court Reporter in the 
6 Third Judicial District, State of Utah, do hereby certify 
7 that the above and foregoing proceedings were, by me, 
8 stenographically reported at the times and places herein set 
9 forth; that said report was, by me, subsequently caused to be 
10 reduced to a typewritten form, consisting of page nos. 1 
11 through 5 both inclusive; and that said report so transcribed 
12 constitutes a true and correct transcription of proceedings 
13 had in the above-entitled cause. 
14 TO WHICH CERTIFICATION, I hereby set my hand 
15 this 20th day of March, 1995, at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
16 
17 
isl fa, 
ED MIDGLEY 
19| Official Court Reporter 
Utah CSR No. 13 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of December, 1995, two 
(2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee Brief of 
Murray City were mailed, postage prepaid thereon, by first-class 
mail in the United States mail, to Gordon Strachan, STRACHAN & 
STRACHAN, Old City Hall, 528 Main Street, P. O. Box 3747, Park 
City, Utah 84060-3747. 
